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MARTIN P. CATHERWOOD LIBRAE 
NEW YORK STATE SCHOOL 
INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATION 
Cornel! University 
Statement of Charles 0. Bakaly, Jr. 
before the 
Commission on the Future of Worker-Management 
Relations 
April §, 1*94 
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before the 
Commission. I am here as a member of the informal Management 
Lawyers Working Group, set up to provide the Commission the views 
of attorneys who represent management in employment law 
matters.1 I am of counsel with the law firm of o'Melveny & 
Myers, currently, I am mediating complex litigation disputes. 
For over 38 years, 1 have specialized in business and employment 
litigation. 1 have been Chairman of the American Bar 
Association's Section on Labor and Employment Law. Z have been a 
member of the President's Commission on National Labor Policy. 
In addition, Z was appointed by the Governor to the California 
Dispute Resolution Advocacy Counsel and served as its Chairman. 
For many years, I served on the Board of the American Arbitration 
1
 William J. Kilberg of our Group addressed you in 
February. Members of the Group include: Vincent J. Apruzzese of 
Apruzzese, McDermott, Mastro t Murphy; Robert S. Carabell, Senior 
Counsel, TRW, Inc.; William J. Curtin of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius; 
Charles A. Powell III of Powell, Tally & Frederick; Ezra Singer, 
Assistant General Counsel — Human Resources, GTE Corporation; 
and Daniel Yager of McGuiness k Williams. 
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Association and as a member of its Executive Committee. I have 
also served on the Center for Public Resources Employment Dispute 
Commission and am presently on the Board of Dispute Resolution 
Services, Inc. I am also a fellow of the American College of 
Trail Lawyers. 
In this paper, I have been asked to address the use of 
alternative methods to resolve today's inevitable employment-
related disputes.2 As ve are all too aware, employment-related 
litigation has risen significantly since the late 1970's. It is 
a trend that i6 likely to continue as many industries, like the 
defense industry, suffer significant downsizing and as 
employment-related tort law in many states expands dramatically. 
As a result, employees and employers are increasingly motivated 
to evaluate alternatives to traditional litigation, including 
arbitration, mediation, facilitation, peer review, or mini-
trials. These types of alternative dispute resolution methods 
offer exceptional advantages to both employees and employers in 
today's workplace. My comments herein are intended to encourage 
the Commission to promote the use of alternative dispute 
resolution in the employment arena. 
One of the alternative dispute resolution practices 
which I have advocated for some time, and which is receiving 
renewed attention and endorsement, is binding arbitration of 
2
 I wish to acknowledge the assistance of Kate W. Duchene, 
Esq. in the preparation of these remarks. 
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workplace disputes. What follows, is my evaluation of the 
propriety and enforceability of binding arbitration agreements 
utilized to this context. I have focused on arbitration, instead 
of some other private dispute resolution practices, because I 
believe arbitration is the only binding vay to enforce private, 
binding dispute resolution and to preclude the use of courts to 
resolve such disputes. I recommend that both employees and 
employers consider entering into binding arbitration agreements 
as a fair, efficient, economical and practical alternative 
dispute resolution method. 
My comments will focus generally on three matters. 
First, I will discuss the traditional arguments voiced in favor 
of and in opposition to binding arbitration of employment-related 
disputes by both the employees' and the employers' bar. I will 
then review recent judicial reaction to and enforcement of 
binding arbitration agreements, including a brief review of the 
U.S. Supreme Court's recent decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/ 
Johnson Lane Corp.*. which brought both employees and employers 
relief in. seeking to avoid civil litigation. Finally, I will 
discuss standards for drafting and implementing an effective and 
fair arbitration agreement. By including certain procedural and 
due process safeguards, an arbitration agreement can protect the 
parties' legal rights and provide remedies equal to and greater 
1
 500 U . S . 2 0 , 111 S. Ct . 1647 ( 1 9 9 1 ) . 
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than those afforded in civil litigation without the burdens 
attendant thereto. 
Traditional Arguments In Favor Of And Opposition To Arbitration. 
In my mind, there are two fundamental reasons to 
promote arbitration agreements in the employment arena. First, 
and perhaps most compelling in today's business environment, 
arbitration is a less expensive and speedier process for 
resolving workplace disputes with remedies not available in 
court. Discovery, preparation costs, and the almost inevitable 
full record appeal are greatly reduced in the arbitration 
arena.* For example, many arbitration agreements provide that 
one deposition may be taken by each side as a matter of right; 
additional depositions may be taken only upon request and consent 
of the arbitrator. Such a practice provides both sides with a 
much less expensive process for resolving their grievance. There 
simply is not the traditional — and expensive — paper war that 
is all too familiar in civil litigation. Arbitration also 
provides for a less expensive trial. Since arbitration is 
generally quicker and more efficient than civil litigation, 
employees and employers can save substantial outlays in both time 
and money. Moreover, the remedies for employees are better than 
4
 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.. 500 U.S. 20, 111 
S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (the discovery burden is reduced in 
arbitration); Madden v. Kaiser Found. HQSPS.. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 711 
(1976) (discovery burden is reduced by "simplified procedures and 
relaxed rules of evidence in arbitration"). 
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a court can give. A court cannot order specific performance of a 
personal service contract, but an arbitrator can order 
reinstatement of the employee as veil as all other remedies 
provided in court proceedings. Finally, review of arbitration 
awards for either party is limited and, therefore, less 
expensive. 
By contrast, costs in civil litigation are great. 
First, discovery practice can often be excessive — a practice 
which particularly burdens the individual employee who must 
absorb such costs. Moreover, such exorbitant costs, like those 
associated with substantial discovery, no doubt influence the 
employee's decision to "take on the company" in the first place. 
In addition, despite the development of fast-track programs in 
many states, the length of time to trial is often quite long. It 
is not unusual for employment disputes to be litigated five 
years. The sheer length of time to trial imposes substantial 
burdens on the employee and the employer.3 Employment disputes 
also decrease productivity and demand substantial time not only 
for management, but also for the employee who is trying to move 
on with life. Simply put, the internal effect of lingering 
litigation can often be quite damaging.' 
5
 Speed benefits both parties. S££, e.g.., Madden v. Kaiser 
Found. HoBps.. 17 Cal. 3d 699, 711 (1976) (the "speed and economy 
of arbitration, in contrast to the expense and delay of jury 
trial, could prove helpful to all parties"). 
* "Private Arbitration As The Exclusive Means Of Resolving 
Employment-Related Disputes," Employee Relations Law Journal, 
Vol. 9, No. 2, p. 5 (Sept. 22, 1993). 
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The second compelling reason arbitration is a preferred 
method for resolving employment disputes is that it stands to 
greatly relieve the already overburdened court system in this 
country. Indeed, it will provide a viable and necessary means of 
alleviating the incredible pressure currently being placed on the 
court system in America. With the recent passage, or proposed 
passage, of the "Three Strikes" legislation in many states, the 
court system is bound to become even more congested than it 
already is. In fact, it has recently been estimated that passage 
of the "Three Strikes" legislation in California will increase 
the number of criminal cases in the court system by two-fold.7 
The court systems can ill afford such additional pressure. Given 
such pressure, all reasonable and fair alternatives to 
traditional civil litigation — like arbitration — must be 
considered. 
Despite the compelling reasons to promote arbitration 
in the employment arena, there are a number of arguments that 
have been raised in opposition. While I do not believe such 
arguments are meritorious in today's environment and in light of 
7
 "Measure Is No Guarantee Of Cut In Violence," The Los 
Angeles Times, March 8, 1994, at A 1 ("There are 5,000 criminal 
trials annually statewide. Prosecutors and some judges say the 
number of felony trials could double under 'three strikes,' 
forcing judges to stop handling civil cases and devote their time 
to criminal cases.") gee also "Some Workers Lose Right To File 
Suit Por Bias At Work," The New York Times, March 17, 1994, at A 
1; Singer V. Salomon Brothers. Inc., 593 N.Y.S.2d 927 (1992) 
("Arbitration is not only authorized by law but also fulfills the 
strong public policy favoring a decrease in the courts' 
burdensome caseload"). 
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the evolution of today's arbitration agreement, they should be 
considered and addressed.' 
First, opponents have decried arbitration proceedings 
as inherently biased in favor of the employer. They have argued, 
infcejc AliA., that the arbitrators are partial, that the employer 
controls the proceedings, and that arbitration proceedings are 
too private. They have argued that certain legal remedies are 
not allowed and that arbitration agreements are not entered into 
t 
voluntarily. Despite such claims, which have been voiced for 
decades, the fairness argument is no longer a real threat to 
doing justice, if it ever was. 
* In addition to the more practical opposition arguments 
referenced below, one commentator, Professor Charles J. Morris, 
has argued that nonunion arbitration procedures adopted 
unilaterally by companies violate Section 8(a)(2) of the National 
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.s.c. {§ 151 e£. s_e_fl. ("NLRA") (see 
Morris, "EGAPa - Arbitration Flans for Nonunion Employees," 14 
Pepperdine L. Rev. 827, 834 (1987)). In essence, Professor 
Morris reasons that an arbitration procedure in a nonunion 
setting is a "labor organization" under Section 2(5) of the NLRA 
and, thus, any employer who implements such a plan without first 
bargaining with employee-selected representatives would violate 
Section 8(a)(2). I have argued and believe that Professor's 
Morris' view should not be countenanced as it is based on a 
strained reading of the definition of "labor organization" under 
the NLRA. Moreover, since the arbitration agreement suggested 
herein is essentially a mechanism by which an individual employee 
can resolve his individual grievance with the employer, it is 
sanctioned by Section 9(a) of the NLRA which recognizes the 
validity of individual contracts employers may elect to make 
directly with individual employees. Sjg£ Charles G. Bakaly, Jr. & 
Jeffrey I. Kohn, Federal Preemption of State-Law Wrongful 
Discharge Actions by Agreements to Arbitrate, 41 Pr«c. N.Y.U. 
Ann. Nat'l Conf. Lab. | 9.04, at 9-39-43 (1988). 
UI-37KM.V1 7 03/2V9* 
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Numerous procedural safeguards are incorporated 
routinely into today's arbitration agreements which address the 
plaintiffs' bar's historical concern about fairness. For 
example, arbitration panels are more diverse and better 
qualified. The selection process for the arbitrator is better 
defined and blindly equal. For instance, by using a recognized 
panel of arbitrators, such as AAA or JAMS, and an equal striking 
system, neither side has the ability to control the arbitrator or 
the process. Arbitrators have also been given the authority to 
award punitive damages and/or emotional distress damages. Thus, 
an employee who sues in civil court is not getting something 
more. Arbitrators can order reinstatement a remedy courts cannot 
give to employees under the common law. Also, most agreements 
require the arbitrator to issue written decisions. The rulings 
are, therefore, public and provide an appellate record. 
A second argument raised in opposition to arbitration 
is that it will negatively affect employee morale. Again, this 
argument lacks merit. Arbitration agreements are often 
implemented at date of hire so there is no unilateral change in 
conditions of employment. Arbitration is also a less costly, and 
less time-consuming process for employees as well. Employees too 
want a fast, fair procedure for resolving their disputes. 
Finally, if communicated appropriately, employees should 
understand the value of an arbitration agreement. Arbitration 
agreements should be fully explained so employees know the 
U1-J71SM.V1 8 03/Z7/»4 
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benefits of arbitration and that both sides are relinquishing 
jury trial rights. 
Third, employers have been concerned traditionally that 
arbitration will nake employees more likely to pursue their 
disputes. This concern is too facile and Ignores reality. An 
arbitration agreement does not create new legal rights, it simply 
provides a different forum for dispute resolution. As there is 
no guaranteed method for avoiding workplace disputes, the best 
< 
either party can hope for is an efficient, fair forum to resolve 
such disputes as quickly as possible. Moreover, in light of 
recent outlandish jury awards in the employment context, it 
appears that filing suit is more akin to buying a lottery ticket 
than vindicating one's rights. 
Fourth, and traditionally, opponents have argued that 
arbitration is not a worthwhile alternative dispute resolution 
method because an arbitration agreement cannot guarantee 
comprehensive coverage of grievances. Fortunately, this argument 
no longer carries much weight. Indeed, in the wake of the U.S. 
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer, as outlined below, fear about 
the comprehensiveness of an arbitration agreement has been 
substantially reduced. Indeed, the rationale of Gilmer, which 
applied the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to extinguish a civil 
court claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA), has been routinely applied to claims brought under other 
statutes. Numerous post-Gilmer cases have eliminated civil court 
IA1-37KM.VJ 9 03/27/»4 
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claims of all kinds of disputes in favor of arbitration — 
including federal race, sex and age discrimination claims — if 
the arbitration agreement is carefully drafted.' 
Recent Judicial Reaction To And Enforcement Of Binding 
Arbitration Agreements 
In its recent seven-to-two decision, the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Gilmer, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act10, 
enforced an arbitration agreement that required a non-union 
employee to arbitrate an age discrimination claim brought under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. As a result, the 
plaintiff lost his right to have a jury hear his federal 
discrimination claim. Prior to Gilmer, it was generally accepted 
that Title VII and certain other statutory employment claims were 
not arbitrable pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in 
' £££ Prltzker v. Merrill Lvnch. Pierce. Fenner i Smith. 
iDfij,, 7 F.3d 1110 (3rd Cir. 1993) (applying Gilmer to ERISA 
Claims); Bander v. A.G. Edwards j Sons. Inc.. 971 F.2d 698 (11th 
Cir. 1992) (applying Gilmer to sexual harassment claim) ; Mago v. 
Shearson Lehman Hutton. Inc.. 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(applying £ilB§i to Title VII claims); Benestad v. 
Interstate/Johnson Lane. 946 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1991); Alford 
v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(same); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 948 F.2d 305, 307-
08 (6th Cir. 1991) (applying Gilmer to Title VII and state-law 
claims, ordering claims to arbitration); Spellman v. Securities. 
Annuities | Ins" Services. Inc.. 8 Cal. App. 4th 452 (1992) (race 
discrimination and employment claims subject to arbitration); 
Fabian Fin. Serve, v. Kurt H. Volk. Inc. Profit Sharing Plan. 768 
F. Supp. 728, 733 (CD. Cal- 1991) (applying Gilmer to ERISA 
claims); fifis also Boooher v. Stifel. Hicholaus | Co.. Inc.. 764 
F. Supp. 574, 576 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (applying Gll$&X. to ADEA 
claim). 
10
 9 U.S.C. IS 1 fit s eg . 
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Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. (holding that arbitration of 
contract-based claims pursuant to a collective bargaining 
agreement does not preclude subsequent judicial resolution of 
statutory civil rights discrimination claims)11. In 
understanding why the Court reversed its traditional hostility to 
binding arbitration of statutory employment claims, a review of 
the background of the Gilmer case is helpful. 
In 1981, Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. hired the 
plaintiff, Gilmer, as a manager of financial services. At the 
time of hire, the company required that Gilmer register as a 
securities representative with the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE). Pursuant to the terms of the NYSE registration 
application, Gilmer agreed in a U-4 form to arbitrate "any 
controversy" he had with his employer arising out of his 
employment or the termination thereof.12 
After he was involuntarily terminated in 1987 at age 
62, Gilmer sued under the ADEA. In response to the suit, the 
company asked the district court to compel arbitration, relying 
on the agreement and the FAA. Gilmer objected to the request and 
demanded a jury trial, relying on Gardner-Denver." The 
district court denied the company's motion to compel arbitration. 
11
 415 U.S. 36 (1974) . 
u
 111 S. Ct. at 1650-51. 
13
 Id- at 1651. 
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On appeal, however, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the 
case, ordering the district court to compel arbitration of 
Gilmer's claim.1* 
Following the Fourth Circuit's decision, Gilmer then 
petitioned to the U.S. Supreme Court for review, in his 
petition, Gilmer argued against compelled arbitration on the 
grounds that compulsory arbitration of his age discrimination 
claim and, concomitant waiver of a jury trial was inconsistent 
with the purposes of the ADEA.15 Gilmer also argued that the 
arbitration procedures were inadequate and that the arbitration 
agreement itself was entered into only because of the unequal 
bargaining power between an employee and an employer." 
Finally, Gilmer argued that prior case law, i.e., Gardner-Denver. 
made clear that plaintiffs could not be compelled to arbitrate 
employment discrimination claims.17 The Supreme Court granted 
Gilmer's petition. 
In ruling on Gilmer's petition, the U.S. Supreme Court 
chose to enforce the parties' arbitration agreement. 
Fundamentally, the Court determined that the FAA arbitration 
agreement provided sufficient procedural safeguards to protect 
13
 Id- at 1653. 
u
 id. at 1654-55. 
17
 IS. at 1656. 
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the employee's rights. The Court found determinative the fact 
that prior case lav had not been decided under the FAA, 
recognizing that recent FAA cases reaffirmed arbitration as a 
favored dispute-resolution mechanism." The Court in ffilmer 
also determined that arbitration of an ADEA claim does not 
contravene the purposes of the ADEA. Importantly, the Court 
reasoned that Congress could have but did not explicitly preclude 
arbitration of ADEA claims." The Court also found that the 
legislative intent behind the ADEA could be advanced by 
arbitration as an arbitration agreement does not preclude an 
employee from filing an EEOC charge, and requesting a federal 
government investigation.ao 
In reaching its pivotal decision, the Court in Gilmer 
rejected broad-based fairness attacks on the arbitral process, 
suggesting that if certain procedural safeguards are present in 
an arbitration agreement, it will be enforceable. In so holding, 
the Court found that the NYSE arbitration rules provided 
" Id- at 1656-57. 
" Similar to the Court's holding in Gilmer. The civil 
Rights Act of 1991 expressly provides that: "Where appropriate 
and to the extent authorized by lav, the use of alternative 
dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, 
conciliation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, 
and arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under 
the Acts or provisions of Federal lav amended J»y this lav.'* 
*° 111 S. Ct. at 165*. Also, it should be noted that a 
private arbitration agreement vould not likely bind the 
government agency or preclude it from filing suit to enforce the 
statute it is charge vith administering. 
U1-371MI.V1 1 3 03/27/9* 
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important safeguards against biased arbitration panels, 
including: 
(1) the parties to the arbitration receive the 
employment histories and backgrounds of the 
arbitrators; 
(2) each party gets one peremptory challenge and 
unlimited "for cause" challenges; and 
(3) the arbitrators must disclose any information that 
could prevent them from giving an objective and 
impartial decision. 
The Court relied upon additional due process and 
practical safeguards in choosing to enforce the parties' binding 
arbitration agreement. First, the fact that the FAA provides a 
final but limited review process by allowing courts to overturn 
an arbitration ruling if the arbitrator is found to be corrupt or 
partial, compelled the Court's decision. Second, the discovery 
allowed as a matter of right under the agreement addressed the 
plaintiff's burden of proof difficulties. The Court recognized 
that arbitration is a tradeoff. While providing limited 
discovery, arbitration does allow for "simplicity, informality, 
and expedition" in the dispute resolution process.*1 Third, the 
Court emphasized the fact that the NYSE rules do not restrict the 
types of relief an arbitrator can award. Fourth, the Court 
focused on the fact that the NYSE rules require that arbitration 
" Id. at 1654-55. 
Ul-371t»».Vl 03/27/9* 
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awards be written and that the decisions be made available to the 
public. In so doing, the Court rejected Gilmer's claim that 
arbitration of discrimination claims would limit the public's 
knowledge of employer's discriminatory policies, thereby 
repressing both the appellate review process and the development 
of the lav. Finally, the Court rejected Gilmer's contention that 
the arbitration procedures did not provide for equitable relief 
or class actions. Instead, the Court recognized that the NYSE 
rules give arbitrators the power to provide equitable relief and 
to conduct collective proceedings. 
In sum, the Court in Gilmer declared that the inherent 
unequal bargaining power between an employee and an employer does 
not dictate that all arbitration agreements are unenforceable as 
matter of law. Instead, absent a showing of coercion or fraud, 
the Court chose to adopt the FAA's stated purpose to give 
arbitration agreements the same force as other contracts.". 
As the agreement was entered into voluntarily, provided for a 
fair and reasonable process, allowed all available remedies at 
law, and did not thwart the development of federal law, the Court 
enforced its terms.13 As time passes it may be appropriate to 
reconsider Gardner-Denver in collective bargaining situations 
" Id- at 1655-56. 
" While the Court did not overrule Gardner-Denver, it did 
distinguish the case on several grounds. Fir6t, the Court 
focused on the fact that pursuant to an individual arbitration 
agreement, the employee owned the arbitration process not the 
union. In Gardner-Denver, and its progeny, the union, not the 
employee, controlled the prosecution of the grievance. 
Ul-37l«8».Vl 1 5 03/27/9* 
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inasmuch as now employees have more control of arbitrations and 
there does not now appear to be any reason to have a distinction 
between represented and non-represented employees. 
As outlined above, the U.S. Supreme Court in Gilmer 
resolved a number of important issues regarding the viability of 
alternative dispute resolution procedures. It did, however, 
leave open one important issue. Specifically, the Court did not 
resolve the "contracts of employment" issue raised in the FAA. 
By its express terms, the FAA applies to "[a] written provision 
in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a 
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or 
transaction."2* It does not, however, "apply to contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of 
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."" 
In the dissent in Gilmer, two justices argued that 
pursuant to the above-referenced express provisions of the FAA, 
any employment-related dispute between employees and employers is 
not arbitrable." The majority opinion in Gilmer avoided 
analyzing this narrow interpretation of the FAA because it had 
a
* 9 U.8 .C. S 2 . 
as
 a. II. 
" 111 S. Ct. a t 1657-60 . 
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not been raised in the lower court.27 Post-Gilmer cases which 
have addressed this issue have determined that the FAA Section 1 
exclusion is limited to those workers engaged in the actual 
transportation of goods in interstate commerce.M Thus, while 
the Supreme Court acknowledged the "employment contract" 
exclusion in passing, it probably has little applicability to 
most employees who do not actually transport goods in interstate 
commerce.*' However, if these issues again get to Superior 
Court, it would be appropriate for the Solicitor General to urge 
the Supreme Court not to hold that arbitration does not apply to 
employee contracts under the FAA. 
It is undisputed that the Supreme Court's decision in 
Gilmer drew attention to the arbitration process. Not only did 
it dispel the traditional, far-reaching fairness arguments raised 
in opposition to arbitration, it also provided instructive 
27
 Id. at 1651-52 n.2. 
" fififi Corion Corp. v. Gln-Horina Chen. 124 Lab. Cases 
(CCH) 1 57220 (D, Mass. 1991), appeal dismissed. 964 F.2d 55 (1st 
Cir. 1992) (FAA § 1 exclusion is inapplicable to arbitration 
provisions in an employee manual given to a manufacturing 
managers who was "involved in the placement of goods in the 
stream of commerce but not in the actual movement of goods in 
interstate commerce"). At least two courts have suggested, 
however, that the FAA § 1 exclusion applies to all arbitration 
agreements that are found in employment contracts. E.g.. Willis 
v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 311-12 (6th Cir. 
1991) ("The FAA was never meant to Incorporate employment 
contracts with the requisite effects on interstate commerce 
within its scope") (dictum); Slawskv v. True Form Founds. Co*-"- • 
No. 91-1822, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7428 (E.D. Pa. 1991). 
" While sparse, the Legislative history of the FAA 
suggests that the drafters intended to exclude from FAA 
arbitration claims by transportation workers. 
LA1-37UM.V1 17 03/27/J* 
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information as to how to draft and implement effective, binding 
arbitration agreements for the benefit of employees and employers 
alike. In the wake of the Court's decision, all parties are 
better positioned to implement enforceable arbitration 
agreements. Indeed, properly drafted arbitration agreements, 
like that described belov, should be utilized with increasing 
frequency as a fair, practical and efficient alternative dispute 
resolution method. 
Standards Tor Drafting And Negotiating An Enforceable Arbitration 
Agreement-
As I set forth in my introductory comments, one of the 
goals of this paper is to suggest to the Commission standards to 
be encouraged in order to ensure a fair, complete, and 
enforceable arbitration agreement for both employees and 
employers. With that goal in mind, outlined below is a brief 
summary of the critical aspects to be included in a binding 
arbitration agreement. While I will not address every single 
element of a preferred agreement, I will highlight the main 
components as a ••best practices*1 guide. 
First, a fair, effective and binding arbitration 
agreement should be drafted to enhance the likelihood of FAA 
coverage. Indeed, for all the reasons enunciated by the Supreme 
Court in Gilmer, providing for FAA coverage remains the safest 
method for ensuring that all disputes, including federal 
LA1-3716B9.V1 I S 
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discrimination claims, will be encompassed by the arbitration 
agreement. The Court in Gilmer settled the issue: the FAA can 
displace federal jury-trial rights because it provides for enough 
due process and procedural safeguards to ensure each party's 
legal rights are protected. As the Gilmer court noted: "'By 
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo 
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits 
to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, 
forum.'"M The issue of whether a state arbitration statute can 
be applied to deprive an individual of a jury-trial right created 
by a federal statute has not been resolved. Thus, in order to 
avoid any uncertainty regarding the comprehensiveness of the 
agreement, arbitration agreements should provide for FAA 
coverage. 
Second, in the wake of Gilmer, I suggest that the 
arbitration agreement not be included in a traditional "contract 
of employment." As Section I of the FAA excludes from coverage 
"contracts of employment," it is a better practice to draft the 
arbitration agreement in a separate document. As referenced 
above, certain courts have limited the FAA's exclusion to 
contracts of workers directly involved in transporting goods in 
" 111 S. Ct. at 1652 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. 
Soler Chrvsler-Plvmouth. IncT. 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)). gee 
alas Baker v. Aubrv. 216 Cal. App. 3d 1259, 1268 (1989) 
("Resolution of [plaintiff's] claim by arbitration does not 
deprive her of her substantive rights. It only changes the forum 
in which they will be resolved."), cert, denied. Ill S. Ct. 66 
(1990). 
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interstate commerce." At least one other court, however, has 
applied the f 1 exclusion to employees who produce goods in 
interstate commerce.32 In addition, at least two other courts 
have intimated that the exclusion applies to all arbitration 
agreements that are located in employment contracts.13 
31
 fififi American Postal Workers Union v. U.S. Postal Serv.. 
823 F.2d 466, 473 (11th Cir. 1987) (postal workers excluded); 
Bacashihua v. Postal Service. 8S9 F.2d 402, 405 (6th Cir. 1988) 
(same); Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local Union Wo. 9. 
739 P.2d 1159, 1162 (7th Cir. 1984) (limiting exclusion to 
transportation industries) (dictum), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 1160 
(1985); DickStein V. DuPont. 443 F.2d 783, 785 (1st Cir. 1971) 
(FAA exclusion does not apply to an account executive for a 
brokerage firm); Corlon Corp. v. Chen. No. 91-11792-Y, 1991 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18395, at *14 (D. Mass. Dec. 27, 1991) (no « 1 
exclusion for arbitration provision in employee manual given to 
manufacturing manager who was "involved in the placement of goods 
in the stream of oonuoerce but not in the actual movement of goods 
in interstate commerce"), appeal dismissed. 964 F.2d 55 (1st Cir. 
1992); Dancu v. Coopers j Lvbrand. 778 F. Supp. 832, 834 (E.D. 
Pa. 1991) ("the Partnership Agreement in this case is not 
excluded from the scope of the FAA. Plaintiff . . . was not in 
any way part of a class workers engaged in interstate 
transportation.•); Soellman v. Securities Annuities j Ins. 
Serves. Inc.. 8 Cal. App. 4th 452, 460 (1992) ("The narrow 
construction accorded section 1 of the FAA by the federal courts 
supports the strong national policy favoring arbitration as a 
means of settling private disputes"). 
32
 United Elec. Radio j Mach. Workers of Am. v. Miller 
Metal Prods.. Inc.. 215 F.2d 221, 224 (4th Cir. 1954) ("[We are 
not] impressed by the argument that the excepting clause of the 
statute should be construed as not applying to employees engaged 
in the production of goods for interstate commerce as 
distinguished from workers engaged in transportation in 
Interstate commerce . . . " ) . 
" Willis V. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc.- 948 F.2d 305, 311-
12 (6th Cir. 1991) (N[T]he FAA was never meant to incorporate 
employment contracts with the reguisite effects on interstate 
commerce within its scope.") (dictum); Slawsky v. True Form 
Founds. Corp.. No. 91-1822, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7428, at *3 
(E.D. Pa. June 4, 1991) (an "arbitration clause located in a 
*contract of employment' . . . is exempt from the FAA"). 
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With the foregoing uncertainty in wind, an arbitration 
agreement memorialized in a separate document remains the most 
conservative approach to this type of alternative dispute 
resolution by both employees and employers. Indeed, at least one 
post-Gilmer case suggests that the placement of an arbitration 
agreement may be determinative of the enforceability issue.34 
Moreover, a separate agreement with an integration clause will 
also minimize fraudulent inducement claims. A separate agreement 
signed by the employee and the employer will also minimize the 
possibility that either party will dispute consent to the 
agreement.'5 Finally, a separate agreement avoids the risk that 
combining the arbitration provision with other terms and 
conditions of employment, like those in an employee handbook, 
heightens the "contract of employment" exclusion problem. In all 
respects, it is preferable to have a succinctly drafted, signed, 
separate arbitration agreement.1' 
* Slawskv v. True Form Founds. Corp.. No. 91-1822, 1991 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7428, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1991) (refusing to 
apply Gilmer as the arbitration agreement "was located in a 
*contract of employment'"). 
" gee Strotz v. Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 223 Cal. App. 
3d 208, 217-18 (1990) ("If a party is unaware he is signing any 
contract, obviously he also is unaware he is agreeing to 
arbitration"). 
s
* Sfifi, e.g., Diakin v. J.P. Stevens & Co.. 836 F.2d 47, 51 
(1st Clr. 1987) ("an intention to be bound by an arbitration 
clause must be affirmatively established, and will not be implied 
from a party's mere retention of a form containing such a 
provision"). 
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Third, it is important to define what claims or 
disputes are covered by the arbitration agreement. An agreement 
drafted to encompass all disputes between the employee and the 
employer, regardless of whether they specifically relate to the 
employment relationship, lessens the arguaent that the agreement 
is an impermissible "contract of employment" within the meaning 
of the FAA. Moreover, as a matter of contract principle, either 
party is permitted to limit the scope of claims to be 
arbitrated.'7 Limitation, however, is probably not in the 
parties' best interests because it reduces the comprehensiveness 
of the agreement.1* In most circumstances, both parties are 
better served by including the broadest definition of covered 
claims.1* In that way, it is clear that ioth parties are 
relinquishing mutual rights. 
57
 £xfli, Volt Info. Sciences. Inc. v. Board of Trustees. 
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (contract may limit the range of 
arbitrable issues). 
• Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc. v. Bvrd. 470 U.S. 213, 217 
(1985) (if some claims are arbitrable and others are not, 
arbitration of the former is required "even where the result 
would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate 
proceedings in different forums"). 
* fi£g Saari v. Smith Barney. Harris Ucham & Co.. 968 F.2d 
877, 880-83 (9th Cir. 1992) (requiring arbitration of claims for 
defamation and polygraph violations), cert, denied. 113 S. Ct. 
494 (1992); Bird v. Shearson Chilian/American Express. Inc.. 926 
F.2d 116, 117-22 (2d Cir. 1991) (claims for breach of fiduciary 
duty pursuant to ERISA are arbitrable), cert, denied, ill s. Ct. 
2891 (1991); Baker V. Aubrv. 216 Cal. fcpp. 3d 1259, 1265, 265 
Cal. Rptr. 381 (state-law overtime claims are arbitrable), cert. 
denied. Ill S. Ct. 66 (1990). 
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Fourth, it is crucial that both parties provide 
adequate consideration for the agreement. A mutual promise by 
both the employee and the employer to arbitrate should constitute 
sufficient consideration in and of itself. With the recitation 
of such mutual consideration, employees are agreeing to give up 
their right to civil court and so is the employer. In other 
words, while covered by such an arbitration agreement, the 
employee cannot file a statutory claim for sex discrimination, 
for example, but neither can the employer file a claim in civil 
court for a temporary restraining order against an employee for 
trade secret violations.40 Regardless of when the arbitration 
agreement is implemented between the parties, however, the 
agreement should be drafted to expressly state what consideration 
has been exchanged. 
Fifth, the parties should define broadly who is 
entitled to invoke the agreement's protection. As above, the 
goal is to increase the comprehensive nature of the agreement. A 
comprehensive agreement provides both employees and employers the 
most peace of mind. If the parties and claims are narrowly 
defined, many of the arbitration agreement's benefits are lost. 
40
 Hull v. Norcom. Inc.. 750 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 
1985) (M[T]he consideration exchanged for one party's promise to 
arbitrate must be the other party's promise to arbitrate at least 
some specified class of claims."); Sauer-Getriebe KG v. White 
Hydraulics. Inc.. 715 F.2d 348, 350 (7th Cir. 1983) (same), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984); fitrotz v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 
Inc. . 223 Cal. App. 3d 208, 216 ("Where an agreement to arbitrate 
exists, the parties' mutual promises to forego a judicial 
determination and to arbitrate their disputes provide 
consideration for each other. Both parties give up the same 
rights and thus neither gains an advantage over the other."), 
cert, denied. Ill S. Ct. 1417 (1990). 
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For example, if an agreement excludes the award of punitive 
damages or costs to the prevailing party, the aggrieved party may 
try to pursue such a claim in civil court. In such a situation, 
either the party's claims will be severed and part will be 
arbitrated or, the entire arbitration night be stayed pending 
resolution of the court case.41 Given such a situation, both 
party's will have lost a major benefit of the arbitration process 
— quick, fair and efficient adjudication of the dispute. 
Sixth, it is critical in averting a fairness or bias 
challenge to the agreement to carefully select the arbitrator. 
The arbitrator(s) should be experienced, unbiased decisionmaker. 
Remember, the Supreme Court in Gilmer inferred that it might 
reject enforcement of an arbitration agreement that failed to 
include an appropriate selection process.42 It is not 
recommended to use in-house arbitrators.41 A much safer 
alternative is to designate in the agreement a recognized forum 
for the arbitration, i.e., the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA) or Judicial Arbitration £ Mediation Services, Inc. (JAMS). 
In so doing, the agreement should include the following 
41
 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.2. 
42
 111 S. Ct. at 1654-55. 
41
 fiej> Kalger Found- Hospitals, Inc. v. superjpr court. 19 
Cal. App. 4th 513 (1993) (Court vacated arbitrator's award given 
the arbitrator and the defendant's prior undisclosed 
relationship): Neaman v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp.. 9 Cal. App. 4th 
1170, 1176 (1992) (arbitrator's past involvement with party 
creates inference of bias); graham v. Sclssor-Tail. Inc.f 28 cal. 
3d 807, 824 (1981) (union representative cannot serve as the 
"arbitrator" of a union member's grievance against a nonmember). 
U1-37UM.V1 2 4 0J/Z7/94 
04/04/1994 16:29 12609089 P. 26 
safeguards: define the selection method, i.e., alternative 
strikes; and define qualification of the arbitrator(s), i.e., 
licensed to practice law or a retired judge. 
Finally, in order to heighten judicial enforceability 
of a binding arbitration agreement, the parties should demand 
certain other procedural safeguards. Among such safeguards are: 
(1) Assure each side the right to representation or 
consultation at the arbitration. The agreement 
should clearly state that the employee and the 
employer can be represented by counsel at the 
hearing. 
(2) Specify the parties' right to pursue dispositive 
motions. It will be helpful to provide the 
arbitrator with authority to consider a motion to 
dismiss and/or a motion for summary judgment. 
Moreover, given the standard, the agreement should 
specify that such motions will be decided pursuant 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(3) Allow any party the right to file a post-hearing 
brief of reasonable length and within a reasonable 
time. 
(4) Mandate that the arbitrator issue a written 
opinion. Remember, Gilmer's argument against 
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arbitration before the Supreme Court, i.e., an 
unpublished arbitration decision would circumvent 
the development of discrimination law and provide 
for ineffectual appellate review. 
(5) Allow any party to pay for and obtain a written 
transcript of all proceedings.44 
(6) Define the arbitrator's authority to decide the 
issue of arbitrability. The arbitrator may also 
have the exclusive authority to resolve disputes 
relating to the interpretation, applicability, or 
enforceability of the agreement. 
v 
(7) Define who pays for the arbitration. Most 
arbitration agreements provide that the 
arbitrator's fee will be shared by the parties and 
posted up front. This reduces the bias argument 
significantly on either side. 
(8) Define what discovery may be taken. As referenced 
earlier, many arbitration agreements allow each 
side one deposition of a lay witness and one 
deposition of any expert witness. Additional 
* SSS. Graham v. Sclssor-Tail. Inc.. 28 Cal. 3d 807, 815, 
825 (1981) (holding an arbitration agreement unenforceable 
because jntsx alia, one party was refused the right to have a 
written transcript prepared). 
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deposition* nay only be taken by permission of the 
arbitrator based on substantial need.*5 
(9) Allow the arbitrator to award appropriate damages. 
Limitation on the arbitrator's ability to award 
certain damages may entitle either party to pursue 
such damages in court.4' Instead of precluding 
them altogether, parties may consider including a 
standard for the arbitrator to follow in awarding 
punitive damages. 
(10) Allow the award of attorney's fees to the extent 
they are allowable by contract or the statute 
governing the claim. 
*
5
 Recognize that a the court may choose not to enforce an 
arbitration agreement which negates discovery altogether. See 
Gilmer. Ill S. Ct. at 1654-55 (inferring that total preclusion of 
discovery may render agreement unenforceable). 
** fiejE J. Alexander Securities. Inc. v. Mendez. 17 Cal. 
App. 4th 1083 (1993) (punitive damages exclusion would require 
civil litigation of liability for "oppression, fraud or malice"); 
Janmort Leasing. Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l. Inc.. 475 F. Supp. 
1282, 1291 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) ("inarbitreble" claims for punitive 
damages under an arbitration agreement simply necessitate a 
separate judicial trial on the issue). See also Cal. Civ. Code 
S 1668 (declaring unenforceable "contracts which have for their 
object, directly or indirectly, to exempt anyone from 
responsibility for his own fraud, or willful injury to the person 
or property of another, or violation of law"). But see Bonar v. 
Dean Witter Reynolds. Inc.. 835 F.2d 1378, 1387-88 nn.17-18 (11th 
Cir. 1988) (punitive damages can be waived under New York and 
Florida law but the waiver agreement must bo clear and 
unambiguous). 
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(11) Provide for limited judicial review of an 
arbitrator's decision. The parties are better 
served by specifying a limited form of judicial 
review. 
In closing, I encourage the Commission to endorse the 
use of alternative dispute resolution in the employment arena. 
While my comments have focused mainly on binding arbitration 
agreements, the policy discussion articulated herein in favor of 
binding arbitration applies with equal force to other private 
alternative dispute resolution practices. As such, all such 
practices should receive increased notice and support by the 
Administration. Indeed, whether it be mediation, peer review or 
arbitration, private resolution of employment disputes holds many 
benefits for both sides. 
It is my sincere hope that the Commission recognize 
that a veil-drafted and thought-out dispute resolution procedure, 
which addresses and includes substantial due process safeguards, 
protects the rights of both the employee and the employer in a 
manner just as effective as that provided in civil court. 
Alternative dispute practices also provide both parties with 
numerous valuable benefits, including a quick, efficient, less 
costly dispute resolution process. While I do not believe that 
legislation is necessary to facilitate the policy goals and 
standards outlined herein, I do believe that the Commission 
should recommend alternative dispute resolution actively to the 
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Administration. Not only i. private
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effective cost-efficient means of resolving employee-employer 
disputes, but also it will provide critical relief to this 
country's overburdened civil court system. 
Thank you. 
U1-17MSI.V1
 2 o 
93/21/U 
TOTAL P.30 
